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Abstract
Background: The idea of personalised medicine (PM) has gathered momentum recently, attracting funding and
generating hopes as well as scepticism. As PM gives rise to differing interpretations, there have been several
attempts to clarify the concept. In an influential paper published in this journal, Schleidgen and colleagues have
proposed a precise and narrow definition of PM on the basis of a systematic literature review. Given that their
conclusion is at odds with those of other recent attempts to understand PM, we consider whether their systematic
review gives them an edge over competing interpretations.
Discussion: We have found some methodological weaknesses and questionable assumptions in Schleidgen and
colleagues’ attempt to provide a more specific definition of PM. Our perplexities concern the lack of criteria for
assessing the epistemic strength of the definitions that they consider, as well as the logical principles used to
extract a more precise definition, the narrowness of the pool from which they have drawn their empirical data,
and finally their overlooking the fact that definitions depend on the context of use. We are also worried that their
ethical assumption that only patients’ interests are legitimate is too simplistic and drives all other stakeholders’
interests—including those that are justifiable—underground, thus compromising any hope of a transparent and
fair negotiation among a plurality of actors and interests.
Conclusion: As an alternative to the shortcomings of attempting a semantic disciplining of the concept we propose
a pragmatic approach. Rather than considering PM to be a scientific concept in need of precise demarcation, we look
at it as an open and negotiable concept used in a variety of contexts including at the level of orienting research goals
and policy objectives. We believe that since PM is still more an ideal than an achieved reality, a plurality of visions is to
be expected and we need to pay attention to the people, reasons and interests behind these alternative conceptions.
In other words, the logic and politics of PM cannot be disentangled and disagreements need to be tackled addressing
the normative and strategic conflicts behind them.
Keywords: Personalised medicine, Definition, Conceptual confusion, Research policy, Healthcare policy, The politics of
naming, Systematic literature review, Methodology, Medical ethics, Contextual meaning
Background
Since the Human Genome Project the prospect of using
genomics (as well as other ’omics) to make medicine
more precisely targeted to the particular biology of indi-
viduals and their diseases has fuelled hopes, ambitious
initiatives and mobilised considerable funding.1 While
several different labels have been used—like precision
medicine and P4 medicine—one has proved especially
popular and successful: Personalised Medicine (hence-
forth PM). As many have pointed out [1–9], doctors
have always practiced with the aspiration to respond to
individual variability and to tailor care and treatment to
the specific needs of each patient. Nevertheless the
popularity of the concept in biomedical sciences, health
policy, science policy and in public discourse is a recent
phenomenon that has been largely stimulated by advances
in genomics and molecular biology [10–13].2 As a concept
that concerns a broad range of stakeholders—scientists
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and policymakers, healthcare workers, the pharmaceutical
and diagnostics industries, IT network providers and
users, health insurances and taxpayers, not to men-
tion patients themselves—it is subject to a variety of
different uses and interpretations [14, 15]. With this
kind of variety typically comes the Babel worry: are
people speaking the same language and understanding
each other? This worry has generated a number of at-
tempts to analyse the meaning of PM, either with the
aim of facilitating better communication and under-
standing or in the attempt to promote or criticise
particular uses [9, 12, 13, 16–20].
So far the most influential analysis has been the paper
by Sebastian Schleidgen and colleagues [12] who have
attempted to accurately specify the nature and boun-
daries of PM.3 They pursue this goal through a system-
atic literature review (henceforth SLR), aiming to extract
from this a more precise definition of PM. No doubt
their attempt addresses a genuine need for some
guidance through a debate that is not easy to ap-
proach. The sheer number of publications, as their
literature survey attests, is daunting; the field is still
young and rapidly evolving; but most importantly
there is lack of consistency in the use of terminology
and concepts. As noted above, PM has also been
named precision medicine, stratified medicine, genomic
medicine, personalised molecular medicine, individualised
medicine, P4 medicine, personalised healthcare—and this
is not even an exhaustive list. The scope of the con-
cept is equally variable, and sometimes explicitly dis-
puted: some use it to refer only to the new
possibilities offered by molecular biology to improve
diagnosis and therapy on the basis of individual bio-
logical differences, some use it much more compre-
hensively to envision a new paradigm of healthcare.
Against this confusing backdrop Schleidgen and col-
leagues’ effort has considerable appeal, insofar as a sys-
tematic literature review promises a solid evidence base
for clarifying the issue. Their study moreover claims to
have important practical implications: according to the
authors their definition provides “an adequate basis for
public discourse on PM” ([12]: p. 2) thus facilitating
legislators in drafting regulatory mechanisms and
making policy decisions, preventing the public from
developing misplaced hopes and fears, and last but
not least preventing stakeholders from pursuing their
own interests above patients’ needs. Another import-
ant achievement that they claim for their work is to
have established the proper scope of the concept:
“PM can only be understood as an add-on to stand-
ard medical care” ([12]: p. 10) and “is not medicine
with a special focus on the interests and preferences
of the individual patient. … Hence PM as such is not
related to the term patient-centred medicine” ([12]: p.
11). The definition at the basis of these claims is the
following:
PM seeks to improve stratification and timing of health
care by utilizing biological information and biomarkers
on the level of molecular disease pathways, genetics,
proteomics as well as metabolomics ([12]: p. 10).
Their emphasis is thus fully on the side of the develop-
ment of new scientific and technological means that will
merely enrich the toolkit of medicine.4 This contrasts
with a trend within the PM literature towards a broader
understanding of PM, namely an understanding that
while centred on the advances of molecular biology,
includes within its remit its clinical translation, imple-
mentation, integration within the healthcare system and
its funding [1, 3, 21–27]. Similarly, their resolute
disconnection between PM and patient-centred care does
not go unchallenged in the literature. Some authors have
put forward plausible reasons for integrating PM and
(some features of) patient-centred care [9, 28–35]. Others
have questioned the use of the label “personalised medi-
cine” only for biologically personalised medicine, arguing
that the concept needs to have a broader and non-
reductionist understanding of “the person”—along the
lines advocated by patient-centred care [8, 19, 34, 36–39].
In light of these opposing views, we think that Schleidgen
and colleagues’ bold and ambitious attempt to provide
such a strict definition deserves close scrutiny. Is their
case robustly grounded and has their method really given
them an edge over other writers arguing for opposite con-
clusions? We conclude that it has not. Our analysis indi-
cates that disagreements and conflicts around the scope
and meaning of PM cannot be solved by producing a bet-
ter definition: for there is more than logic and semantic at
stake. Hence we urge to map and understand the
theoretical and practical (i.e. ethical, economic, political,
professional) reasons and roots of disagreements. In this
way, if we are lucky, we may promote mutual understand-
ing and reasonable accommodations, and if the goings get
though we may expose some of the cunning of power and
vested interests.
Discussion
Outline of the argument
Since our argument is rather long and structured in
several steps, readers may find it helpful to have the plan
of the discussion clearly laid out at the outset. We begin
by questioning Schleidgen and colleagues’ use of a SLR
in the “methodological critique” section, which is arti-
culated in three stages. We first question the epistemic
robustness of definitions and the lack of selection criteria
that pay attention to how definitions are produced and
which purpose they serve. Then we examine the process
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of extracting a more precise definition and argue that the
logical principles used to filter out noise are not norma-
tively neutral and beg some questions. We further argue
that Schleidgen and colleagues’ evidence base is too
narrow, for they have confined their review to only one
type of literature to the effect that their results are partial
towards the point of view of one group of stakeholders.
The conclusion of this long initial section is that Schleidgen
and colleagues’ use of a SLR has some rhetorical force, but
actually does not provide robust and compelling grounds
for a normative definition.
In the next section, “philosophical critique”, we con-
tend that they have misplaced hopes in the power of
definitions—because having a solution accepted in the
real world is not simply a matter of offering philoso-
phical arguments—and a mistaken belief that concepts
can be defined without paying proper attention to the
context of use and the purposes of users. In the following
section we make a more general point and call attention
to the distinction between two related but different
disputes about PM: namely the question of the extension
of the concept (and drawing the boundaries with neigh-
bouring ones) and the question of what is the most
appropriate name for what we refer to as PM. These are
not merely “logical” questions: they are ethical and political
as well since they affect the roles and responsibilities of
different stakeholders and hence their power and leeway.
Our argument culminates in the “values and plura-
lism” section, where in an almost Hegelian spirit we
attempt to show that once we appreciate the reasons why
“PM” is such a messy concept and why people wrestle
around it and put forward competing visions, then we
may make sense of the apparent confusion, see the ration-
ale behind it and the costs of getting rid of it.
Any attempt at disciplining the use of a contested con-
cept is unlikely to be neutral in its implications or accept-
able to all stakeholders. Because of their attempt to pin
down and restrict the concept, Schleidgen and colleagues
fail to give all voices a fair hearing and unwittingly favour
those of some stakeholders. In the attempt to stay clear of
stakeholders’ interests for the sake of neutrality they have
made themselves blind to the normative and non-neutral
implications of their own analysis. We agree that philo-
sophers should aim to lessen confusion—though not by
ignoring complexity or prematurely adjudicating between
contenders—but by making this complexity and the alter-
native perspectives that constitute it more intelligible.5
Therefore, we propose to see PM as a work in progress
and the label for a cluster of visions for the future of
healthcare (cf. [14, 18, 40]). One of its key functions today
is to bring together stakeholders and in order to do that it
has to remain open to different and sometimes conflicting
interpretations [16, 41]. This openness itself, though not
without its dangers, is valuable in that it may help to
prevent that the preferences and aims of only a subset of
stakeholders shape the language and the agenda giving
them a hegemonic position. Once we acknowledge the
contestedness of PM, decisions that adjudicate between
conflicting interests have to be justified through fully
engaging in normative debates. The clarity and fairness of
such normative work can be greatly enhanced by a preli-
minary philosophical mapping of the values and interests
that motivate different actors.
Methodological critique
We believe that the high impact of Schleidgen and col-
leagues’ paper is largely due to their having based their con-
clusions on a systematic literature review, a method that
over the last three decades has achieved a very high status.
As is well known, together with randomised controlled tri-
als (RCTs) and meta-analyses, SLRs are the primary tools of
Evidence Based Medicine and of Evidence Based Policy,
two prominent trends in the medical and policy domains
respectively. The importance of SLR is well exemplified by
the key role they play in the work of the Cochrane Collab-
oration and of the Campbell Collaboration: the two most
authoritative and emblematic institutions in supporting
evidence-based medicine and evidence-based social policy
and in disseminating their results [42, 43]. SLRs have
earned their reputation as powerful tools for providing reli-
able evidence and solid empirical grounding, especially
when performed on literature reporting the results of RCTs.
These latter provide the solid experimental evidence while
SLRs conveniently synthesise their results. The robustness
of their results depends on the quality of the studies
reviewed: SLRs are subject to the principle garbage in, gar-
bage out. This is why SLRs often need to mediate and make
trade-offs between two desiderata: synthesising all the evi-
dence available vs. synthesising the best evidence available
[44, 45]. The former avoids introducing any bias, the latter
avoids relying on poor quality evidence. When the latter
option is chosen the criteria of exclusion become very im-
portant and have to respect widely acknowledged principles
of methodological robustness.
Epistemic robustness
It is important to keep in mind why and under which
conditions SLRs deliver robust results. This is achieved
when the set of reviewed studies includes either a large
number of methodologically sound small RCTs or a
smaller number of methodologically sound large RCTs.6
We will call reviews that meet these criteria epistemically
robust SLRs. To what extent does the review conducted
by Schleidgen and colleagues meets the conditions that
secure the robustness of its results?
SLRs typically analyse reports of experimental results or
other empirical inquiries. In dealing with their sources
assessing and weighing their strength is paramount. This is
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done along two dimensions. Reviewed studies are assessed
on the breadth of their evidence base and the robustness of
their method. The larger the evidence base and the more
robust the method, the more weight is accorded to a study.
A small observational study cannot count as much as a
large RCT. Schleidgen and colleagues do not analyse re-
ports of experimental results, but academic papers featur-
ing a definition of PM. This makes their SLR atypical.
What is more questionable, they do not apply any selection
or classification criteria to their material. They simply ag-
gregate PM definitions as if they were all arrived at through
rational procedures as reliable as an RCT. Our objection is
that, just as different empirical studies must be assessed
differently and ranked in order of epistemic merits, so too
must definitions be approached with sensitivity to how
they were arrived at. We should be equally sensitive to the
fact that the purpose a definition serves is likely to vary.
The following list of examples is not meant as an exhaust-
ive taxonomy, it simply shows that even in the academic
debate definitions constitute a heterogeneous category of
variable quality and epistemic strength.7
Sometimes PM definitions are used by authors to spe-
cify their own use of the term in a given paper (e.g. [46,
47]). Assuming that the authors manage to use it consist-
ently, a definition of this kind is robust; however its “evi-
dence base” is limited since it can claim only to apply in
one case. Then there are papers where the authors define
PM in order to characterise how this phenomenon is
commonly understood (e.g. [3, 48]). Often these are expert
opinions, offered by scholars who can claim familiarity
with the field and acknowledged expertise. However, even
if these definitions are often supported by references to
the literature, they are not necessarily worked out accord-
ing to systematically collected evidence. This marks them
off as “less robust” than definitions of a third kind. Some
PM definitions that aim at describing actual use boast
both a broad evidence base and derivation from well-
established methods, e.g. comprehensive literature re-
views. The paper of Schleidgen and colleagues fits in this
latter category (cf. also [13, 27]). Yet their methodology
passes over such epistemic differences and overlooks that
definitions vary in nature and quality. Treating all defini-
tions as equals leads to the striking and paradoxical result
that in an iteration of their systematic review their own
definition (based on reviewing more than 1400 defini-
tions) would count no more than a definition describing a
rather idiosyncratic use or one casually dropped in an edi-
torial. This epistemic blindness seems to us a betrayal of a
key methodological rule of SLRs.
Logical issues
Another departure from the conditions of epistemic ro-
bustness is that Schleidgen and colleagues do not simply
synthesise the findings: they want to come up with a
“precising” definition, i.e. they want to single out PM’s
core meaning so as to reduce vagueness. In order to com-
pensate for the lack of quality criteria for inclusion and to
produce an improved definition, Schleidgen and col-
leagues have to combine the extraction of results with a
process of “noise removal”. The processing of their inputs
(the definitions found) happens in two stages. The first is
an extraction of features organised along the categories of
ends and means of PM, the second is a filtering through
the application of “logical” criteria. Roughly speaking we
have first an analytical dissection (resolutio) of definitions,
and then a synthetic recombination (compositio) guided
by some normative principles. We are going to focus on
the recombination process, because it is the most unusual
and original feature of their SLR, as well as being the “lo-
gical laundromat” that turns inputs of variable quality into
an output of higher quality and value.
The authors employ “six criteria of adequate defini-
tions” ([12]: p. 5) that are then used to filter the defin-
itional features found in the literature. Focusing on the
first two principles will be enough to make our point.
The first is that “a definition must be necessary, i.e. there
must not exist any well-established term equivalent with
its definiens” ([12]: p. 5). This principle raises a question
that the authors completely ignore. As mentioned, sev-
eral other names have been used to indicate what they
define as PM. Considering that there was a different use
of PM in the medical literature (see [49–51], cf. [52, 53])
and that patients often attribute to it a meaning different
from those prevailing among medical researchers
([34, 39, 54: pp. xiii-xiv, 55: p. xii]), it is not clear why
they do not even consider adopting one of these synonyms
rather than the ambiguous PM. After all it seems a fair
corollary of the principle of necessity that one should not
use a name already in use if equally valid alternatives are
available and thereby avoid unnecessary multiplications
and confusions. Adopting instead, say, the label “stratified
medicine” would avoid misunderstandings and associa-
tions with person (or patient)-centred medicine (that seem
particularly invidious to Schleidgen and colleagues) and
also prevent unfounded hopes of genuinely individualised
’omics therapies [56]. More generally, their principle of
necessity seems to us to call for a serious discussion of the
fact that their definition (i.e. their definiens) could be used
for stratified medicine and precision medicine. We find
surprising that Schleidgen and colleagues neither tackle
this problem nor attempt to consider what is the relation
between PM and related concepts. This is not a criti-
cism of the principle itself, but of the fact that
Schleidgen and colleagues fail to apply it thoroughly.
Taking the principle seriously should raise the ques-
tion not only of defining the concept, but also of
how to name it, since many different names have
been used for the concept here referred to as PM.
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That said, the criterion of necessity is not unproblematic
in the context of the task the authors set for themselves.
By requiring that what is described by the definiens is
new, the criterion rules out the possibility that PM has
always been there and is nothing new. This was one of the
competing understandings of PM mentioned at the begin-
ning of their paper and it seems illegitimate to simply rule
out one of the contending interpretations through some
logical stipulation. Would it be logically incorrect to
conclude that PM is something broader and more generic
than what they have defined, while what they have defined
is, say, ’omics medicine? If not (and the authors provide no
reason for thinking that it is) then it should not be ruled
out by some criterion for adequate definition. It is peculiar
to want to determine whether PM is something new or
not and then to assume that it has to be something new.8
The second logical criterion they propose is that “a
definition must be neither too broad nor too narrow”
([8]: p. 5). This evidently leaves a lot of scope for the
judgment of the authors and hence introduces a strong
subjective element. For instance they make some choices
on the basis of their understanding of what falls within
and outside the boundaries of medicine, and their in-
terpretation is clearly open to question, as when they
claim that “prevention and therapy are what constitute
health care” ([8]: p. 10), a position that has the rather con-
troversial implication of excluding palliative care from
health care.9
Selection bias
Perhaps the most important reason why their SLR is not
up to the task set by the authors is its narrow scope.
The authors sensibly want to ground their definition on
the actual use of the term, but then questionably limit
the survey to “[PM] definitions appearing in the academic
literature” and to “its current use in the sciences” ([12]: p.
2). They themselves acknowledge that PM “has become a
buzz word in the academic as well as public debate
surrounding health care” ([12]: p. 1). Hence actual use is
clearly not confined to the academic literature. Schleidgen
and colleagues justify excluding “the stakeholders’ dis-
course” from their survey by wanting to exclude vested in-
terests and ill-founded hopes. What they want is to focus
on the “actual scientific possibilities as well as limitations
of medical measures labeled as PM” ([12]: p. 2). We are
not convinced by this argument. One reason of perplexity
is that if they want to avoid hype they should not only
exclude what is beyond the scientific limits, but also what
is non viable because it is financially not sustainable, ethic-
ally unacceptable for patients or healthcare providers,
incompatible with deeply entrenched professional cultures
and practices etc. (cf. [57, 58]). Another and more serious
problem with their argument is its naive assumption that
biomedical literature is immune from stakeholders’
interests. It is hard not to see that the research community
has a great stake in PM and that they are as vulnerable to
the temptation of hype as any other stakeholder, to the
point that social scientific and historical looks at PM have
emphasised the key role of expectations in gaining mo-
mentum and shaping actual developments [11, 14, 15, 40,
58–62]. For fear of stakeholders’ vested interests they have
appointed one group of stakeholders as the only
authoritative voice, thus leaving their interests uncon-
trolled by any check and not counterbalanced by conflict-
ing interests.10
Taking a more inclusive perspective is possible, since
others have looked at different stakeholders groups and
captured different voices. Lada Leyens and colleagues [27]
have shown that a literature review can be done of policy
documents about PM—and the results are rather different
from those of Schleidgen and colleagues. McFarland and
colleagues [39] and Heusser [34]—drawing from a Swiss
study—provide some empirical evidence of patients’ views
of PM, and a survey of General Practitioners’ views would
be necessary to test how popular is the view that PM “has
always been a component of good medical practice”,
“based on the relationship between patient and physician
rather than on any particular technology” ([37]: p. 1684).
Views vary not only across stakeholders but also across
circumstances, to the effect that the same stakeholders
may express differing views according to their interlocu-
tors. For instance, Susanne Michl [14] has shown that
academic authors provide different visions of PM when
they write for their peers and when they address the lay
public. The list of stakeholders could be made longer, but
the essential point is clear: any definition that reflects only
a subset of uses (e.g. the internal discourse of biomedical
researchers) is bound to be biased.
Instead of producing a PM definition robustly grounded
in empirical evidence, Schleidgen and colleagues have
ended up making methodologically dubious moves and
producing a definition grounded in only one source of
evidence. It is revealing that at the end of their paper
Schleidgen and colleagues seem to recognise some of these
shortcomings. They admit that PM cannot be treated
simply as a scientific concept, because it has already estab-
lished itself outside the purely scientific discourse. When
scientists step out of their laboratories, “Personalised
Medicine” will inevitably evoke (unpredictable) associations
and expectations. Surprisingly, they therefore conclude by
proposing to abandon the term altogether (“To forestall
false hopes attached to the concept and accordingly wrong
decisions regarding investments, it might be reasonable to
adapt terminology” ([12]: p. 12)) and to adopt “stratifying
medicine” instead—and indeed we agree that stratified
medicine is the more accurate label. Nevertheless we con-
clude that a discourse analysis might have been a more ap-
propriate method for achieving their goal and that carrying
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out a SLR has not in itself made their analysis and proposal
more compelling than alternative ones.
Philosophical critique: concepts and meaning
Having noted problems with the authors’ choice of
method and the result (the definition) it yields, in this
section we move on to the further question whether a
definition could possibly have achieved the result they
were aiming for. We argue that their project is ham-
pered by philosophically dubious ideas about definitions
and the workings of language more generally, and also
that it reflects a lofty view of the importance of concep-
tual analysis.
The authors start by describing PM as a hopelessly
vague term, and aim therefore to help “structuring the
debate over PM’s meaning by developing a sufficiently
precise definition” ([12]: p. 2). Sharper concepts may be
helpful in giving a more coherent structure to a diffuse
debate. However, in practice the quality of one’s analysis
is not the main factor determining what influence one
has on a debate. What impact (if any) their definition
will have on the subsequent PM debate ultimately
depends on how it is received by the pertinent readers.
Unless this more focused definition is also seen as suit-
ably focused (and thus as an improvement) by a suffi-
cient number of stakeholders, its effect on the debate is
likely to be limited. Confident in their undertaking, the
authors anticipate some disagreements—but only minor
ones, since, according to them, the majority already
understands PM more or less in line with their definition
([12]: p. 11).
The suggestion is that their definition may indeed
succeed in structuring the subsequent debate because
the debate already is (largely) structured around the
stratification of treatment on the basis of molecular bio-
logy. This is puzzling. By claiming that their definition
ought to be acceptable to the majority since it converges
with the dominant understanding,11 the argument seems
to invite two interpretations: either their solution works
only under the assumption that the problem is already
solved—which is no solution at all—or there is no major
disagreement to speak of in the debate—which is to say
that there never was a problem to be solved in the first
place. The authors may accept the latter interpretation,
not as an objection but rather as an account of what
they have discovered, namely that at the centre of the
debate, obscured by inconsistent terminology, there is
major agreement on PM’s meaning. Hence what their
definition actually does is to bring this common ground
into sharper focus. This move would be untenable, how-
ever, because their empirical evidence does not warrant
such a conclusion. In the previous section we observed
how the authors selectively reviewed only academic pa-
pers; but what prompted their hunt for a sharper
definition was the cacophonic impression created by
various stakeholders using PM to signify different things
in “the academic as well as public debate surrounding
health care” ([12]: p. 1)—and they have not provided any
reason for believing that the majority in this broader
context will find their results acceptable. Consider this
conclusion:
As our results show, PM is not medicine with a
special focus on the interests and preferences of the
individual patient. For instance, PM does not include
any reference to an adequate doctor-patient relation-
ship. Hence, PM as such is not related to the term
patient-centered medicine. ([12]: p. 11)
If this is meant to be a statistical remark about the use
in scientific literature, it is correct. We are not contesting
their empirical findings, merely emphasising the obvious
point that what they found is a function of where they
chose to look—as other studies suggest [34, 39, 63] a
survey among patients or family doctors would probably
have yielded different results. What they can reasonably
claim to have shown is that references to adequate
doctor-patient relationships are uncommon in the scien-
tific literature about PM, and that, in the context of sci-
entific reporting on new findings in genomic and
molecular biomarkers, PM can be defined in purely mo-
lecular terms. But the more ambitious claims about this
being the “true” meaning of PM cannot be supported,
since if PM is a notion used in different contexts and by
different actors, then what PM is and should be cannot be
determined by extrapolating from the use of one group of
stakeholders in one specific context.
At the roots of this mistake is a philosophical assump-
tion about language: that words may be sharp or vague in
themselves. The paper is subtitled “sharpening a vague
term”, and the suggestion is that the lack of a precise def-
inition is responsible for the varying uses of “PM”. Lack of
a fixed meaning, however, is not peculiar to PM. Consider
the concept “game”: there are board-games, card-games,
ball-games, computer games, Olympic Games and chil-
dren’s games; we may speak of mind games, game shows,
the game of politics; philosophers discuss language-games
[64] and psychologists sometimes talk about social games
(as in “the games people play”, [65]). A continuum of uses
may of course make a concept philosophically confusing
and difficult to pin down; but this does not necessarily
mean that either the term or people using it are confused.
Miscommunication can of course arise when people using
the same concepts differently come together. Tempting as
it may be, philosophical abstraction is not the solution, be-
cause the meaning of words is generally determined by
where and why words are used. When is a knife sharp
enough? It depends on the context. Depending on the
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work it is meant to do, the same knife may be both dull
and sharp—in the hands of a child practicing wood carv-
ing it may be dangerously sharp, while it may still be
hopelessly dull for proper fish filleting. Similarly, it is futile
to attempt a precise definition of “PM” without a fairly
definite context in mind, since distinguishing between
precise and imprecise uses of a word is possible only when
the aims and purposes are clear. Misunderstandings and
disagreements will have to be solved when they arise by
people patiently negotiating their meanings and purposes.
There is no general philosophical quick-fix (for a philo-
sophical discussion see [66–68]).
Therefore it makes no sense to stipulate the rules for
how “PM” should be used without simultaneously de-
scribing the circumstances under which those rules
would apply. Schleidgen and colleagues’ definition is in
this respect an abstraction—both in the pejorative sense
of being other-worldly and in the etymological sense of
being disconnected from its proper surrounding. Their
aim is to provide “an adequate basis for public discourse
on PM”, but unfortunately they leave the notion of “pub-
lic discourse” too vague and unspecified to provide a
meaningful context: sometimes public discourse is pre-
sented in contrast to academic debate, sometimes it
seems to include this latter. We are told nothing specific
about this public debate: what it is about, what is at
stake in it, who the stakeholders are, what their conver-
ging and conflicting interests are? All these crucial ques-
tions are left unanswered. As a result what could count
as a sufficiently precise definition in such a hazy context
is very hard to figure out. Taking seriously the variety of
actual uses, one should not assume that a concept like
PM must be held together by some common core, for
the simple reason that in so far as this is partly an em-
pirical question one must remain open to the possibility
that there may be no one thing in common to all uses of
“PM”.12 Instead of trying to reduce the complexity by
determining rules for the use of “PM”—as if one rule
could be valid universally or prohibit the word from
travelling and thus taking on new meanings—a more
sensible way to try to clear the fog would be to context-
ualise the various uses so that we can achieve a clearer
view of the aim and functioning of the words.
Two sources of disagreement
Once discussions are viewed more in context it is easier
to appreciate that there are two kinds of disputes around
the notion of PM. The first concerns the extension or
scope of the concept: i.e. discussions about what it
includes and what lies outside its remit. These concep-
tual disputes are often tackled by producing a taxonomy
of concepts and placing PM within it (see for instance
[13, 17, 19]). The other dispute—often arising in reaction
to a narrow understanding of PM as genomic
medicine—centres on whether “PM” is the appropriate
label or rather a misnomer or an objectionable expropri-
ation of a name with a broader meaning. Some authors
resent the fact that the words “personal” and “personal-
ise” that used to belong to clinical practice—especially to
primary care—have been appropriated by biomedical sci-
ence, which is thus exploiting its rhetorical force and
emptying it of its critical potential to oppose narrow and
reductionist approaches to medicine [19, 34, 38].
One issue is how to organise the logical space, i.e.
what kind of conceptual grid is needed in order to
specify most effectively the boundaries and relations
between neighbouring concepts, e.g. to establish whether
PM and Genomic Medicine are co-extensional, mutually
exclusive, partially overlapping or one subsuming the
other. For instance, Pokorska-Bocci and colleagues [13]
suggest a grid with 4 basic concepts subsumed by one
more general concept, which in turn is subsumed under
another still more general one. But once the grid has
organised the relations between concepts, there is the
question of what is the most appropriate name for each
cell of the grid (i.e. for each concept). For instance, if a
distinction has been drawn between attempts at perso-
nalising medicine through 'omics and through other
means the question arises whether either of the two
should be called “personalised medicine”—or whether
PM should be used as a broader concept encompassing
both. Reasons for and against each possibility can be
given. Calling ’omics medicine “PM” has the advantage
of reflecting a common use, but the disadvantage of not
being very accurate because arguably what can be
achieved is stratification of patients rather than person-
alisation [69, 70, 71]. Using PM only for personalising
measures not based on molecular biology goes against
what is now a widespread use, but it could be a way of
reclaiming a name that has been captured by molecu-
lar medicine [19, 38]. Using PM as a broader category
may seem a fair and conciliatory choice [13], but again it
may be confusing given the prevailing current use—that’s
why “personalised healthcare” is often preferred for this
purpose [9, 17]. As it already emerges from these exam-
ples, questions of naming are affected by a diverse range
of considerations: semantic clarity, consistency with estab-
lished uses, but also grievances towards the practices with
which they are connected, and considerations of fairness
and impartiality. Lexical choices have as much to do with
ethics and politics as they have with logic and semantics.
Furthermore how these multiple criteria are balanced and
weighed is open to reasonable disagreement ([72]: II, §2).
Another source of indeterminacy lies in the fact that
PM is very much a future-oriented concept. More than
an existing reality, PM is currently the controversial
label of a cluster of visions for (some aspects of) the
future of healthcare. Future-oriented concepts, aimed at
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mobilising initiatives and building networks, are bound
to be fluid and contested. Given that it is still something
in the making, what PM will become depends on what
the technologies can actually deliver and which decisions
are made, which in turn depends on who gets involved,
which ideals, values and interests different stakeholders
want to realise, which alliances are formed among stake-
holders, which compromises are made, which scientific
discoveries take place etc. [14, 18, 59]. In view of this,
the attempt to decide what PM will become is not only
premature, but also fails to understand the current grip
of the term. By trying to structure the debate around a
predefined and limited range of topics one obscures the
fact that which people are using the concept and the
contexts in which they do so are key determinants of its
meaning. This is why attention should be refocused
towards stakeholders and their roles, aspirations, powers
and on how they converge and conflict.
Philosophical critique: values and pluralism
We have argued that the meaning of concepts depends
on their context of use, and that this in turn importantly
depends on the purposes of people. Now we want to
suggest that stakeholders and their interests are also
contextual and relational, thus requiring a form of ana-
lysis that accounts for such pluralism. Schleidgen and
colleagues at the beginning of their paper suggest a view
of medicine as a practice centred on one fundamental
goal (meeting patients’ needs) and that other interests,
especially economic ones, can only be disturbances to be
kept out. We want to show that this is a simplistic and
false picture and that stakeholders have goals and pur-
poses (beyond the health of patients) that are perfectly
legitimate and need to be recognised. Furthermore, the
interests of patients and stakeholders cannot be deter-
mined in the abstract: they need to be worked out in the
appropriate contexts.
It should be noticed that not all medical needs are
equally urgent and serious, especially when health needs
are supply-induced (e.g. by pharmaceutical industry
[73, 74]). Thinking that patients’ interests always and
necessarily override any other interests is both unrealistic
and morally unwarranted. Arguably some non-vital pa-
tients’ interests have no claim on doctors’ time or on
taxpayers’ money. So all we need to say is that patients’
serious interests have prima facie priority, but can occa-
sionally be overridden by other legitimate stakeholders’
interests, when a convincing case for these latter can be
made.
Moreover, to claim that one particular value or interest
is central and articulates the goal and the ethos of a
particular activity (e.g. medicine) does not entail that any
other value and interest is always and necessarily subor-
dinated and overridden, let alone irrelevant. On the
contrary, other values and interests constitute the frame-
work of constraints within which any activity is itself sus-
tainable, permissible and valuable. So for instance, the
extremely long working hours of junior doctors (or resi-
dents, as they are called in the USA) may be criticised be-
cause they jeopardise patients’ safety [75], but also because
they are exploitative.13 However, the view that stakeholders’
interests have no place in medicine would disallow the lat-
ter reason of complaint. We can make the point in loftier
Kantian terms: stakeholders should not be treated simply as
means (for promoting health), but also always like ends in
themselves, i.e. like people with their own aims to pursue.
But to have goals implies being interested in the means to
achieve them, and when resources are not unlimited this
leads to concerns about their distribution, i.e. to economic
issues.
While we share Schleidgen and colleagues’ concern
that the economic interests of, say, the pharmaceutical
and biotech industries may orient PM too much in view
of their own profit, we believe that bluntly condemning
(direct or indirect) economic interests gives too sim-
plistic and moralistic a picture. We rather need to make
an honest appraisal of economic interests and acknow-
ledge that, within proper limits, they are legitimate.
Surely it is not always wrong for taxpayers to be con-
cerned about escalating health costs, for patients to
worry about out-of-pocket payments or loss of working
days and income, for policy-makers to wonder about the
sustainability and opportunity costs of endorsing a new
health technology, for industries to aim for a profit.
Furthermore, as we have anticipated, stakeholders’ goals
and preferences too should be seen as context-dependent:
they emerge in real situations as responses to problems,
challenges and conflicts. Doctors are doctors when lobby-
ing against health care cuts, but they are cardiologists,
oncologists and pediatricians when making claims about
how the health budget should be allocated. Patients are
sick people, but they are also tax-payers and perhaps par-
ents concerned about the future sustainability of the
healthcare system. It is in response to concrete difficulties,
hard choices and rival claims that groups of stakeholders
get formed, are defined and articulate their aspirations.
Since stakeholders’ interests are not necessarily illegiti-
mate and they are not given and fixed, we can appreciate
that the plurality of visions of PM is not only an unfortu-
nate source of confusion, but also the result of a variety of
concerns and aspirations being articulated.
If we have a closer look at the implications of acknow-
ledging the context-dependence of stakeholders’ inter-
ests, we should realise that these contexts are socially
constructed and that this means that they are framed by
other stakeholders who have set the agenda and the
discursive space. Contexts come with biases: to reset
them in neutral terms is rarely, if ever, possible. This is
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why seeing PM as an open negotiable concept not only
reflects current reality better, but may also be useful and
enrich the ethical reflection around PM: accepting a plu-
rality of visions allows for a variety of fora where a multi-
plicity of views is voiced, so that gatekeeping and framing
is not monopolised by any one group or coalition. The
openness and negotiability of “PM” may help to prevent
hegemonic control over it and capture of the concept by
some stakeholders (cf. the concept of disciplinary capture
[76, 77]). Our claim is that the current plurality of visions
of PM may not only be an annoyance and an obstacle—an
unfortunate source of confusion—but may also be the re-
sult of a variety of concerns and aspirations being articu-
lated by different stakeholders in different contexts. If this
is the case, imposing a more consistent view may not be a
desirable solution: we suggest instead that we accept PM
as an open negotiable concept. This would be no panacea,
but rather a coping strategy that is still preferable to a very
invasive therapy.
Conclusions
Our task has been largely critical, because we believe
that in the literature about PM there are too many
attempts to bring order and clarity without really under-
standing the deep roots of the disputes and that any
semantic claim has deep normative implications. For
instance if, against all odds, Schleidgen and colleagues’
attempt were successful, it would decide against those
who argue for a not merely molecular view of the per-
sonalisation of medicine without even having given a fair
hearing to their arguments. Schleidgen and colleagues
have pursued the task of “sharpening a vague term” with
the goal of preventing stakeholders from appropriating
it. However they have ended up embracing the point of
view of some stakeholders without realizing that the ap-
propriation of the concept by those very stakeholders is
itself a cause of contention. Furthermore, and ironically
enough, in spite of their (overstated) claim that patients’
benefits override any other stakeholders’ interests, they
have completely excluded the voice of patients from the
construction of their definition.
We suggest that in dealing with personalised medicine
it is wise to turn on its head Marx’s famous statement
that it is time for philosophers to move from interpret-
ing the world to changing it. So instead of attempting to
impose a particular view of PM it would be wiser to be
more modest and more open. We should acknowledge
the fuzziness, the differences as well as the similarities
between many views and visions of PM voiced in diffe-
rent circumstances. A thorough and (as far as possible)
unbiased description of this cluster or family of related,
overlapping and sometimes contradictory understand-
ings of PM (and its relations to neighbouring concepts
like precision medicine, stratified medicine, and patient-
centered medicine) seems the appropriate starting point
for any philosophical clarification of the concept of PM.
Any attempt to go beyond a description of the situation
and an interpretation of its drivers becomes a normative
attempt and as such needs to engage explicitly with com-
peting normative claims. When language and politics are
intermingled—as is the case with PM—there is no such
thing as purely logical tidying up. What is in dispute are
not merely terminological disagreements, but are different
values, ideals and allocations of powers and resources.
The question “What is PM?” cannot be separated from
questions like “Who contributes what to PM?”, “Who is
setting the agenda?”, “Who has been excluded?”, “Who
gets what?”. None of these questions is settled yet, and so
it seems to us that rather than trying to pin down an
elusive concept, it would be worth mapping stakeholders’
aspirations and interests and try to contribute to make the
negotiations about the future of PM as fair and transpa-
rent as possible.
Endnotes
1The European Commission recently endowed the call
for research on Personalised Medicine with € 659
million [78], and claims to have already committed more
than € 1 billion since 2007 [79]. In the US president
Obama in the 2015 State of the Union launched the
Precision Medicine Initiative (precision medicine is part
of Personalised Medicine as we use the term in this
paper) and then endowed it with $ 215 million [80–82].
2It should be noted that another driver of PM is the
development of self-tracking devices that allow indivi-
duals to collect data and information that could be used
to monitor and promote health [83–88]. This trend is
usually subsumed under the concept of the Quantified
Self (or self-tracking) and linked to the concept of PM
especially in the literature aiming at popularising the
concept [14]. While it is likely that we are going towards
an integration of information coming from molecular
biology and information coming from personal wearable
or implanted devices, in the present paper we focus
on molecular biology and leave aside self-tracking
technologies.
3On April 4 2016 the article boosted 50 citations
according to Google scholar, 16 citing articles according
to Web of Science, 7792 accesses according to BMC
Medical Ethics, 24 citations according to the ranking of
bioethical articles produced by Georgetown University
Research Library, where the paper ranked 19th for the
year 2013 (thus looking like the most influential bio-
ethical publication on the topic of defining PM), and it
has been included in a recently published anthology on
The Ethics of Personalised Medicine [89].
4A reviewer remarked that the word “utilizing” in the
definition may suggest that they include translation,
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implementation etc. The reason why we have not
followed this charitable reading is that Schleidgen and
colleagues understand the possibilities and limitations of
PM only in techno-scientific terms and see PM as just an
add-on to current practice, thus seeming to rule out
the need for structural changes and downplay the im-
portance of organisational and financial adjustments
demanded by PM.
5Our objection is not against taking a stance. But
when taking sides in a debate, one should do so not pre-
tending to be merely doing logical tidying up, but should
fully engage with the normative claims in the debate.
6Clearly this is an oversimplification. In certain cases,
for instance when external validity is more important
than internal validity, other design studies may be pre-
ferable to RCTs. However, here our point is simply that
if the sources reviewed lack robustness, the final result
cannot claim much strength.
7The same kind of sensitivity should be used in un-
derstanding what kind of academic papers one is
reviewing. Reviews, editorials and commentaries are
all academic subgenres, but differ radically from re-
search articles, and the criteria to judge how reliable
and robust they are vary accordingly. For instance ex-
perimental results have different weight if they report
an early observation of a phenomenon or whether
they confirm very compellingly earlier more tentative
studies. An editorial or a commentary has to be read dif-
ferently when it is about a scientific issue that is contro-
versial or about one over which there is a settled
consensus. The role of different genres of scientific writing
in PM is stressed by Adam Hedgecoe [54].
8Here again the problem is that they have not dis-
tinguished between concepts and names. It is indeed
possible that PM is sometimes used to refer to an old
concept and sometimes to a new concept [4, 90], and
it is certainly possible that there are sensible criteria
for naming that suggest to use PM for the old con-
cept and a new name for the new concept. If they
wanted to give a fair refutation of the view that PM
is nothing new, they should have shown that PM
(broadly defined to accommodate common current
uses) cannot be used to identify pre-existing medical
practices because such practices are already covered
by an existing concept different from PM. If this were
the case this proposed use of PM for old medical
practices would be unnecessary, redundant and con-
fusing. But they have not shown that. It is also worth
noting that some proponents of PM (e.g. [69]) have
explicitly presented it as the scientific culmination of
the time-honoured medical habit of adapting knowledge to
individual cases. For a discussion of this dialectical tension
between PM as revolutionary and as consistent with the
medical tradition see [11, 14, 15].
9For the articulation of a broader and historically rooted
view of medicine that includes not only curing and pre-
venting but also relieving and comforting see [91].
10It is worth remembering that the genomic under-
standing of PM first appeared in 1997 in an article by
Andrew Marshall [92] who used the concept in the plural
(“personalized medicines”) and in his next publication
dropped it in favour of “pharmacogenomics”. The paper
that really kicked-off the new understanding of PM was
Langreth and Waldholz’s “New Era of Personalized Medi-
cine” which appeared in 1999 in the Wall Street Journal
and shortly after was reprinted by The Oncologist [93].
This paper reports the strategies and alliances that
pharmaceutical industries had launched on in pursuing
new opportunities in pharmacogenomics (incidentally the
opportunities for pharmaceutical industry were given as
much emphasis, if not more, as benefits for patients
already in Marshall’s 1997 paper). This should remind us
that stakeholders’ interests have contributed from the start
to shape the visions of PM and that many researchers pio-
neering PM were working for pharmaceutical or biotech
companies, making it hard to separate science from indus-
try (cf. [58]).
11Though one may assume the authors think everyone
ought to accept their definition, they have no illusions
that in fact they will; however they do claim that their
definition ought to be regarded as acceptable by the
majority ([12]: p. 10).
12For instance Richard Tutton noted (in 2012, before
Schleidgen and colleagues published their paper) that “there
have been different historical forms of ‘personalization’ over
time” ([11]: p. 1726) and that before the rise of genomic
medicine, clinicians had used it to describe a way of
practicing medicine “endangered by continued technolo-
gization and reductionism of biomedicine” ([11]: p. 1721).
A recent article published in such a prestigious journal as
The Lancet [94] shows that this understanding of PM has
not disappeared. Hedgecoe and Martin [59] have shown
that even within that subset of PM represented by pharma-
cogenetics, alternative visions of its mission and scope exist
and that these latter are affected by the coalitions that
support them and can be modified when this latter change.
“For example, as new groups of actors join the emerging
network, they may favour particular options over others
and shape the future direction of research” ([59]: p. 330).
These examples suggest that PM is an evolving con-
cept, still fluid and whose meaning is not, and cannot
be, fixed yet.
13It has been noted that junior doctors have fewer pro-
tections than workers in sweatshops [95] and prisoners
of war [96].
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